sears3820:
"Do they have any solid ones left in the farm system?"
The best answer to this question is Joel Sherman's column in the NY Post a few days ago. Some of it is sensationalism and complete b.s., but most of it rings true. I've cut out the b.s. in this post. If you want to read the whole thing, I've pasted the link:
http://www.nypost.com/seven/05082005/sports/yankees/46171.htm
ROTTING FROM INSIDE OUT
There is the chasm between the Tampa and New York executives. There is the attempt to problem solve by always favoring older, more famous and more expensive players. There is the lack of formal consultation with the manager about player procurement (Joe Torre wanted the team-first Cairo back). There is the refusal to give a prospect a full chance to secure a job. And there is the disregard about how any individual move impacts 25-man roster construction.
The ramifications have hit the Yankees at once, like a perfect storm, leaving their roster old, overpaid, inflexible and with few prospects to address the difficulties through promotion or trades. This is an old, brittle team that should only become more brittle with time. Greater parity means fewer weak sisters for the Yanks to feast on as opponents or salary-dumping trade partners. Teams have done a better job locking up prime-age stars, specifically starting pitchers, to long-term pacts, weakening free-agent classes in the near future.
So how did the Yanks get here? The Post contacted more than 20 people who work or have worked for the Yankees or do business regularly with the team to ask their opinions. Here is the consensus of how potentially the biggest financial disaster in sports history came to be:
PLAYER DEVELOPMENT
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Yankee minor-league honchos Bill Livesey and Brian Sabean stalked high-risk, high-reward talent. Livesey devised profiles for each position, based largely on size, and the Yankee system was replete with tall, athletic players that fed the big-league club and were appealing trade bait.
Sabean and Livesey benefited from drafting high in the first round due to poor major-league teams and Steinbrenner's 21/2-year suspension in the early 1990s. That bred patience to let players work through the system.
But those Yanks did not live by the first round alone. In 1990, for example, the Yanks drafted Kevin Jordan, Ricky Ledee, Andy Pettitte, Jorge Posada and Shane Spencer between the 16th and 28th rounds.
Beginning in the late 1990s - with Livesey and Sabean long gone - the Yanks grew timid in the draft under the direction of Mark Newman and Lin Garrett. The Yanks behaved more like a "Moneyball" team, emphasizing college players because, in part, Steinbrenner demanded victories in the minors, especially at Rookie-level Staten Island, and having a roster full of college players rather than high schoolers or young Latin imports favored that possibility.
But that also meant bringing in many players who were about as good as they were going to get. Since the Yanks have a near iron curtain between their minors and their 25-man roster, only high-end guys have a chance to stick long-term. So the Yanks should have been using their financial advantages for high-risk, large-reward types - Scott Boras clients who slipped due to signability issues or high-ceiling high-school types ignored by the influx of "Moneyball" teams. But Steinbrenner also had demanded more frugality, one agent said, because he felt burned by a couple of large signings and also because it was a place he could appease Bud Selig by not setting new financial standards.
The results? Randy Keisler's 11 starts are the most for the Yanks by any pitcher they have drafted in the last decade. The most at-bats for the Yanks by any position player they drafted in the last decade are Nick Johnson's 769. The next highest is Andy Phillips' 40.
2001: A draft odyssey
Yanks' penchant for picking college players cost them in first round that year:
PICK TEAM PLAYER
23 Yanks John-Ford Griffin
Non-prospect now in Blue Jays system
25 A's Bobby Crosby
2004 AL Rookie of the Year
26 A's Jeremy Bonderman
Now ace of Tigers' staff
When the Yanks have reached for high schoolers, they have been complete busts (Andy Brown, Drew Henson). The most disturbing high school loss is Mark Prior, picked 43rd overall in 1998. Though they budgeted the $1.5 million Prior wanted, the Yanks low-balled initially at $800,000. By the time the Yanks reached $1.5 million, Prior was infuriated and decided to go to college.
In the last two drafts, the Yanks have been more aggressive, and their first-round picks, high schoolers Eric Duncan and Philip Hughes, are considered superb prospects, but are nowhere near ready to help the big club. After Robinson Cano, Chien-Ming Wang and Sean Henn - all Grade B prospects at best - the Yanks have no one nearly ready now to be promoted.
Internationally, the Yanks have been more aggressive financially than most teams, and endured big-time flops such as Kats Maeda, Jackson Melian, Andy Morales, Adrian Hernandez and Edison Reynoso. Yet in 1998, they finished second to the Angels' $900,000 for a Venezuelan righty named Francisco Rodriguez. How about a Yankee staff right now with Prior and Rodriguez?
POOR EVALUATIONS
How about a Yankee staff with Damaso Marte (two wins, one save for White Sox) and Yhency Brazoban (one win, nine saves for Dodgers)? They were considered non-prospects by the Yanks. Marte was dealt for dime-a-dozen utilityman Enrique Wilson and Brazoban was a throw-in when the Dodgers were desperate to rid themselves of Kevin Brown.
The Rangers were willing to pay $67 million to the Yanks to make Alex Rodriguez disappear because he was untenable playing for Buck Showalter. So why would the Yanks include a high-ceiling prospect like Joaquin Arias in addition to Alfonso Soriano? The Yanks could have traded Jose Contreras earlier last season for Jeremy Reed, and instead waited and ended up with Esteban Loaiza.
If the Yanks had Reed and either Brazoban or Arias, they would have had enough enticing prospects to get Randy Johnson in the middle of last season, in which case The Curse would be in year 87 and counting.
When Gene Michael was making trades, he had Jeff Weaver/Javier Vazquez-like mistakes (think Jim Abbott and Terry Mulholland) mixed in with his voluminous successes. What he avoided was dealing prospects that badly burned the organization elsewhere.
Beyond trades, Cashman misread the market on Jon Lieber this offseason. The Yanks let Orlando Hernandez walk out of fear of his shoulder giving out, yet signed the shoulder-plagued Jaret Wright. Both Lieber and Hernandez had proven they could handle being a Yankee, which is an important element for an organization that has endured Contreras, Weaver, Hideki Irabu, Kenny Rogers, Denny Neagle and Vazquez. Pedro Martinez was a no-doubt-could-pitch-in-New York-guy, and the Yanks never considered him.
The Yanks knew Bernie Williams was about finished after the 2003 season and imported Kenny Lofton. Williams was only more faded after the 2004 season ended, yet the Yanks began this year with Bubba Crosby as their backup center fielder, and shunned Carlos Beltran.
The Yanks misread the market multiple times in shunning early-career, multi-year contract requests from Derek Jeter and Williams. Conservatively, the misreads and delays cost them more than $50 million, has Williams still under an expensive contract beyond his usefulness and explains how you go from large to obscene payrolls.
With a rare chance to trade a high-level, major-league-ready youngster (Lowell) and deepen their system, the Yanks wound up getting three useless pitchers from Florida in 1999. In a better day, the Yanks turned Danny Tartabull into Ruben Sierra, who helped the Yanks make the playoffs in 1995, and then turned Sierra into Cecil Fielder, who helped the Yanks win the 1996 World Series. Now they turn Ted Lilly into Weaver into Brown - good to bad to worse.
Wily Mo Pena for Drew Henson
The Yankees:
1. Gave Pena a major-league contract, which pressured them to trade him rather than lose him to waivers.
2. Stupidly traded him to the Reds for Henson.
3. Foolishly gave Henson a six-year contract.
4. Unwisely promoted Henson beyond his abilities.
5. Stunted any potential growth, and emotionally tied their farm system to his rise and ultimate fall.
TAMPA-NEW YORK DIVIDE
During the championship years, an uneasy truce existed in the Yanks' divided house with Michael as GM, Newman running Tampa and Cashman in New York as assistant GM/traffic cop. Now the distrust is worse than ever among the factions.
These days, Michael, the main architect of the dynastic Yanks, is paid $600,000 annually and mostly ignored. Newman floats from limited to no influence in Tampa. And Cashman is a GM in title, but not in power. The New York office believes those in favor with Steinbrenner now - Oppenheimer, Billy Connors and Bill Emslie - form a shadow government in Tampa of second guessers and yes men, their proximity to The Boss stoking paranoia. The Tampa contingent feels the New York staff is too apologetic for Torre and his staff, especially when it comes to lack of instruction.
There are many rival executives sympathetic to Cashman, who point out moves Cashman was divorced from such as Lofton, Loaiza, Womack, Gary Sheffield and Felix Rodriguez. But Cashman's batting average includes pushing for Brown, Vazquez and Weaver. The bigger problem, though, is that there is no single vision, no set chain of command. The pro scouts in Tampa, for example, report to Emslie, a former traveling secretary who socializes with Steinbrenner, without much input from Cashman. Connors has held autonomy running the organization's pitching program for a decade despite horrible results.
And both sects are leery of the influence of the politically savvy, New York-based team president and lead negotiator Randy Levine, who more than anyone in the organization has Steinbrenner's ear and is near equally impatient.
In the offseason, for example, the Tampa group reached accord with reliever Dae-Sung Koo without recognizing the implications to the 40-man roster, and Cashman had to undo the deal. Koo now pitches for the Mets.
Two offseasons ago after Sheffield backed out of a verbal agreement for a contract, Steinbrenner told Cashman to follow the GM's desire and pursue Vladimir Guerrero. As a deal with Guerrero neared finalization, Sheffield rescinded his demands. Steinbrenner convened a Guerrero or Sheffield meeting.
The New York group plus Newman in Tampa voted for Guerrero. The Tampa contingent, which included Sheffield's uncle Dwight Gooden, voted for the St. Petersburg-based Sheffield. It was a tie, which Steinbrenner broke in favor of Sheffield.
The rift also leaves the Yanks without a cohesive single vision on building a team. What has been hurt the most by this is constructing 25- and 40-man rosters with adequate Plan B and C depth (you back up one no-hit guy like Womack with another like Rey Sanchez). A team with as much age/fragility as the 2005 Yankees should have concentrated a lot more on using their financial advantage to create a safety net, especially after seeing the Red Sox win with the length of their roster last year. Dave Roberts, anyone?
EASY ANSWERS
Players like Lilly are not left alone to grow, protected by strong veterans around him. Steinbrenner's tolerance for failure at any position or a plan that involves tomorrow has completely evaporated. Executives theorize that as Steinbrenner faces his mortality, his lust to stuff more titles into his life further drives him.
So the Yanks end up spending more for players who are expensive, older and have already played their best games, a combination that makes them hard to trade. Posada, Giambi, Williams, Mike Mussina, Brown, Tom Gordon, Paul Quantrill, Felix Rodriguez, Mike Stanton and perhaps Mariano Rivera seem shells of their former selves. That is 40 percent of the roster, even with Steve Karsay gone. How do you fix that many shortcomings during one season?
The Yanks have let their roster turn from great to gray, and the players have gone soft, not ready to battle enough and waiting for more of Steinbrenner's money to solve issues with a Roger Clemens or Ken Griffey Jr., older players who would likely just exacerbate the problem.
Also having so many players used to being the sun god has fostered a 25-man, 25-personal trainer mentality around the team. The fraternity is not as good. These are like corporations dealing with one another, not people.
JOYLESSNESS
The run of four titles in five years from 1996-2000 and the ever-inflating payrolls have made anything less than a parade a miserable campaign. Each year, regular-season wins become more unfulfilling while each loss is a sock in the gut. The whole season is defined by 11 victories in October. What that has forged is an utter lack of fun around the Yankees. It is all pressure, all the time. And that has suffocated many in the clubhouse.
MANAGER/COACHES
Like Phil Jackson, Torre and pitching coach Mel Stottlemyre are superb caretakers of star players. That is not easy. Torre and Stottlemyre have flourished by draining tension, bolstering confidences and not getting in the way of superior talent by over-thinking strategy and instruction.
But the number of pitchers who have left the Yanks and improved elsewhere (albeit most in the easier-to-pitch NL) raises questions if Stottlemyre is still connecting with his staff. And this clearly is a roster that needs more activist intervention.
In addition, Torre and his staff have always been decidedly old school, not embracing much new technology. Only now when they are behind many teams in this area, notably the Red Sox, are the Yankees, for example, using video scouting with younger coaches Joe Girardi and Rob Thompson leading the way.
LOST AURA
The dynastic Yankees won many games by just showing up. They actually maintained their aura in losing the 2001 World Series because it was hard to fathom how they nearly won while being badly outplayed by Arizona. But starting in 2002, when the Angels smoked the Yankee rotation in the Division Series, the Yanks have lost a layer of invincibility annually. No longer are teams intimidated when the Yanks are in the opposing dugout.
The strongest mystique of all, The Curse, is even dead, and so it appears are the days of the Yankees as a super team.
