I was going through some old papers I wrote, and one of them was about the legal and historical genesis of juristic people as right holders. It really is a terribly interesting story -- that is, how the legal precedent for the sharing of some rights came to be -- but it's also a worthwhile question. How equal should we be under law when there is no equality biologically or economically? I'm going to steal some quotes from that paper, and a couple of my own passages, but this is all put together for the sake of a discussion here. I'm genuinely interested to see if anyone else ever spent any time on this issue, and what their thoughts are.
Some of you, no doubt, already know that it's not entirely unreasonable to suggest that the assumption that artificial/imaginary/juristic persons are due natural human rights may have been something of a clever legal theft, but at best was the result of legal confusion. Those less familiar would probably suggest it sounds a bit far-fetched, but the truth is (as I understand it, and I spent quite a bit of time on the subject some time ago) that there is no valid point of origin in law for such a transfer. Don't misunderstand; the current prevailing legal theory does indeed assume that corporations are persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth amendment, and this can be traced directly back to Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) -- but that case dodged the issue, rather than established it as law. It's not, technically speaking, valid precedent.
Here's the lineage:
In preceding arguments for Santa Clara, Justice Waite said:
This statement (not part of the case, not binding precedent, not law at all) was entered into the reporter thusly:
And then it was used as precedential support by Justice Harlan (as an early example) in Covington & Lexington Turnpike R. Co. v. Sanford, 164 U.S. 578 (1896).
Follow that again if you're unfamiliar. A pre-'trial' statement subject to no argument or review and not a matter of law, entered into the reporter for the case by a former railroad executive (more on that in a moment) in slightly stronger language, cited in subsequent cases as legal precedent.
Let me stop for a moment and say that this isn't necessarily about presenting it all as some sort of nefarious conspiracy. Even if the reporter (John Chandler Bancroft Davis) had a vested interest in seeing this become law, the reality is the whole thing is probably more a legal novelty than anything else. Nonetheless, what the railroads had been trying (and failing) to accomplish for years through the lower courts was accomplished by a misleading summary by a single court reporter.
Davis had worn a number of hats in his life before becoming the United States Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions. He was the son of John Davis, the governor of Massachusetts. His brother was Congressman Horace Davis. He practiced law, served as a newspaper correspondent, served as secretary to the American embassy in London, was U.S. Minister to Germany, and served twice as Assistant Secretary of State. He was the Court Reporter of Decisions from 1883 to 1902, and (interestingly) also served previously as the president of the board of directors for the Newburgh & New York Railroad Company.
So that's a snapshot of the rather compelling (I think) background on the issue. Here, then, is the lead-in to my question:
A natural man has blood, knows his life to be finite, bears rights and liberties afforded him by the Constitution, and may suffer civil and criminal consequences alike if he violates the law. A typical man, by most measures, is of singular means. While he may contract to exchange with others, may share in labor, may partake in the creation and/or operation of a corporate body, his ability to shape anything beyond his immediate environment and experience is naturally limited. A juristic person's life is by no means tied to an inevitable biological destiny and is by some definitions an immortal. As discussed above, a juristic person shares (as a result of the headnote that served as precedent) a measure of the rights and liberties of the natural man. Unlike him, the juristic person cannot go to jail, it faces only civil recourse for any actionable misdeeds or negligence. The greatest different may be in its means. The corporate person stands apart of the natural man in terms of power, reach, and influence over the shape and process of law and government. While the man may serve even the highest offices, he may never alone wield the power to influence our society the way some particularly powerful and deep-pocketed corporations do. One only has to look as far as the oil and pharmaceutical industries to find copious and sometimes terrible consequences for this truth.
While the foundation (of/for) juristic people as "persons" in the eyes of the Fourteenth Amendment may be based on legally dubious ground, it may well be that such a distinction is a formality. Legal precedent achieved by any means is still open to re-interpretation and adjustment, and over the years the Court has slowly chipped away at some of the rights juristic persons have enjoyed. It may be worth noting that such erosion has certainly not seemed to harm these imaginary people, as their status and power in our society seems (at times) to be at potentially dangerous highs. It is difficult to accept equal treatment, in regards to our (that is, for "natural people") rights and liberties, when certain exceptions to the same do not apply. Corporations routinely make economic decisions that may cost natural persons their welfare and/or lives, but may face no criminal charge for the taking of life, even through a grossly negligent act. It faces punishment through exclusively civil channels, and often in the form of fines. As discussed above, a corporation may be immortal, may wield the will and the power of all of its shareholders, but does so with a single purpose in mind -- profit. The utility and benefit of these structures, and the economic growth and opportunity they provide is without question, but one has to wonder if one of the theories that suggest there are better ways to legally perceive and treat these "people" might lead to a more equitable and even safe distance between natural and artificial persons. There seems to be, in some quarters, a nebulously defined hope that if the Court addresses the shaky foundation of this area of law, and finally hears arguments on the question itself, that some of the more pervasive ills that beset us by way of the immense power and influence of corporate structures will be remedied. However, this seems to be too great a leap. What we may be able to reasonably hope for are simple, clearer distinctions between natural Americans and the artificial constructs comprised of the same. Then again, just as it did in 1886 when this matter was 'decided,' the Court may simply choose to avoid the question entirely, when and as it faces it again in the future.
So my questions are simple, really. Should natural and juristic people stand equal under the law? If not, what rights should juristic people not have? Should juristic people face criminal consequences for actions or inactions that would be deemed criminal for natural people? If you were going to do it all over again -- how would you distinguish between natural and artificial?
Persons are divided by the law into either natural persons or artificial. Natural persons are such as the God of nature formed us; artificial are such as are created and devised by human laws for the purposes of society and government, which are called corporations or bodies politic.
Sir William Blackstone, 1 BL. Com. 123
Sir William Blackstone, 1 BL. Com. 123
It was probably a mathematician that first conceived the plan of feigning an unreality as a convenient step in the formation of [a] hypothesis, and then, having established his theory, conveniently let his fiction disappear.
George Deiser. "Juristic Person I," The University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 57, No. 3, Vol. 48, New Series, pp. 131-142 (Dec., 1908)
George Deiser. "Juristic Person I," The University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 57, No. 3, Vol. 48, New Series, pp. 131-142 (Dec., 1908)
Some of you, no doubt, already know that it's not entirely unreasonable to suggest that the assumption that artificial/imaginary/juristic persons are due natural human rights may have been something of a clever legal theft, but at best was the result of legal confusion. Those less familiar would probably suggest it sounds a bit far-fetched, but the truth is (as I understand it, and I spent quite a bit of time on the subject some time ago) that there is no valid point of origin in law for such a transfer. Don't misunderstand; the current prevailing legal theory does indeed assume that corporations are persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth amendment, and this can be traced directly back to Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) -- but that case dodged the issue, rather than established it as law. It's not, technically speaking, valid precedent.
Here's the lineage:
In preceding arguments for Santa Clara, Justice Waite said:
"The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does."
This statement (not part of the case, not binding precedent, not law at all) was entered into the reporter thusly:
"The defendant Corporations are persons within the intent of the clause in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which forbids a state to deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
And then it was used as precedential support by Justice Harlan (as an early example) in Covington & Lexington Turnpike R. Co. v. Sanford, 164 U.S. 578 (1896).
"It is now settled that corporations are persons, within the meaning of the constitutional provisions forbidding the deprivation of property without due process of law, as well as a denial of the equal protection of the laws. Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pac. Ry. Co., 118 U. S. 394, 6 Sup. Ct. 1132; Pembina Con. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 189, 8 Sup. Ct. 737; Railroad Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 29, 9 Sup. Ct. 207; Railroad Co. v. Gibbes. 142 U. S. 386, 391, 12 Sup. Ct. 255."
Follow that again if you're unfamiliar. A pre-'trial' statement subject to no argument or review and not a matter of law, entered into the reporter for the case by a former railroad executive (more on that in a moment) in slightly stronger language, cited in subsequent cases as legal precedent.
Let me stop for a moment and say that this isn't necessarily about presenting it all as some sort of nefarious conspiracy. Even if the reporter (John Chandler Bancroft Davis) had a vested interest in seeing this become law, the reality is the whole thing is probably more a legal novelty than anything else. Nonetheless, what the railroads had been trying (and failing) to accomplish for years through the lower courts was accomplished by a misleading summary by a single court reporter.
Davis had worn a number of hats in his life before becoming the United States Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions. He was the son of John Davis, the governor of Massachusetts. His brother was Congressman Horace Davis. He practiced law, served as a newspaper correspondent, served as secretary to the American embassy in London, was U.S. Minister to Germany, and served twice as Assistant Secretary of State. He was the Court Reporter of Decisions from 1883 to 1902, and (interestingly) also served previously as the president of the board of directors for the Newburgh & New York Railroad Company.
So that's a snapshot of the rather compelling (I think) background on the issue. Here, then, is the lead-in to my question:
A natural man has blood, knows his life to be finite, bears rights and liberties afforded him by the Constitution, and may suffer civil and criminal consequences alike if he violates the law. A typical man, by most measures, is of singular means. While he may contract to exchange with others, may share in labor, may partake in the creation and/or operation of a corporate body, his ability to shape anything beyond his immediate environment and experience is naturally limited. A juristic person's life is by no means tied to an inevitable biological destiny and is by some definitions an immortal. As discussed above, a juristic person shares (as a result of the headnote that served as precedent) a measure of the rights and liberties of the natural man. Unlike him, the juristic person cannot go to jail, it faces only civil recourse for any actionable misdeeds or negligence. The greatest different may be in its means. The corporate person stands apart of the natural man in terms of power, reach, and influence over the shape and process of law and government. While the man may serve even the highest offices, he may never alone wield the power to influence our society the way some particularly powerful and deep-pocketed corporations do. One only has to look as far as the oil and pharmaceutical industries to find copious and sometimes terrible consequences for this truth.
While the foundation (of/for) juristic people as "persons" in the eyes of the Fourteenth Amendment may be based on legally dubious ground, it may well be that such a distinction is a formality. Legal precedent achieved by any means is still open to re-interpretation and adjustment, and over the years the Court has slowly chipped away at some of the rights juristic persons have enjoyed. It may be worth noting that such erosion has certainly not seemed to harm these imaginary people, as their status and power in our society seems (at times) to be at potentially dangerous highs. It is difficult to accept equal treatment, in regards to our (that is, for "natural people") rights and liberties, when certain exceptions to the same do not apply. Corporations routinely make economic decisions that may cost natural persons their welfare and/or lives, but may face no criminal charge for the taking of life, even through a grossly negligent act. It faces punishment through exclusively civil channels, and often in the form of fines. As discussed above, a corporation may be immortal, may wield the will and the power of all of its shareholders, but does so with a single purpose in mind -- profit. The utility and benefit of these structures, and the economic growth and opportunity they provide is without question, but one has to wonder if one of the theories that suggest there are better ways to legally perceive and treat these "people" might lead to a more equitable and even safe distance between natural and artificial persons. There seems to be, in some quarters, a nebulously defined hope that if the Court addresses the shaky foundation of this area of law, and finally hears arguments on the question itself, that some of the more pervasive ills that beset us by way of the immense power and influence of corporate structures will be remedied. However, this seems to be too great a leap. What we may be able to reasonably hope for are simple, clearer distinctions between natural Americans and the artificial constructs comprised of the same. Then again, just as it did in 1886 when this matter was 'decided,' the Court may simply choose to avoid the question entirely, when and as it faces it again in the future.
So my questions are simple, really. Should natural and juristic people stand equal under the law? If not, what rights should juristic people not have? Should juristic people face criminal consequences for actions or inactions that would be deemed criminal for natural people? If you were going to do it all over again -- how would you distinguish between natural and artificial?
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