Findings
Our most saddening and sobering finding is the total disregard for the safety and
welfare of Sandusky?s child victims by the most senior leaders at Penn State. The most
powerful men at Penn State failed to take any steps for 14 years to protect the children
who Sandusky victimized. Messrs. Spanier, Schultz, Paterno and Curley never
demonstrated, through actions or words, any concern for the safety and well-being of
Sandusky?s victims until after Sandusky?s arrest.
In critical written correspondence that we uncovered on March 20th of this year,
we see evidence of their proposed plan of action in February 2001 that included
reporting allegations about Sandusky to the authorities. After Mr. Curley consulted with
Mr. Paterno, however, they changed the plan and decided not to make a report to the
authorities. Their failure to protect the February 9, 2001 child victim, or make attempts
to identify him, created a dangerous situation for other unknown, unsuspecting young
boys who were lured to the Penn State campus and football games by Sandusky and
victimized repeatedly by him.
Further, they exposed this child to additional harm by alerting Sandusky, who
was the only one who knew the child?s identity, about what McQueary saw in the
shower on the night of February 9, 2001.
The stated reasons by Messrs. Spanier, Schultz, Paterno and Curley for not
taking action to identify the victim and for not reporting Sandusky to the police or Child
Welfare are:
(1) Through counsel, Messrs. Curley and Schultz have stated that the ?humane?
thing to do in 2001 was to carefully and responsibly assess the best way to handle
vague but troubling allegations.
(2) Mr. Paterno said that ?I didn?t know exactly how to handle it and I was afraid
to do something that might jeopardize what the university procedure was. So I backed
away and turned it over to some other people, people I thought would have a little more
expertise than I did. It didn?t work out that way.?
(3) Mr. Spanier told the Special Investigative Counsel that he was never told by
anyone that the February 2001 incident in the shower involved the sexual abuse of a
child but only ?horsing around.? He further stated that he never asked what ?horsing
around? by Sandusky entailed.
Taking into account the available witness statements and evidence, it is more
reasonable to conclude that, in order to avoid the consequences of bad publicity, the
most powerful leaders at Penn State University ? Messrs. Spanier, Schultz, Paterno and
Curley ? repeatedly concealed critical facts relating to Sandusky?s child abuse from the
authorities, the Board of Trustees, Penn State community, and the public at large.
Although concern to treat the child abuser humanely was expressly stated, no such
sentiments were ever expressed by them for Sandusky?s victims.5
The evidence shows that these four men also knew about a 1998 criminal
investigation of Sandusky relating to suspected sexual misconduct with a young boy in
a Penn State football locker room shower. Again, they showed no concern about that
victim. The evidence shows that Mr. Paterno was made aware of the 1998 investigation
of Sandusky, followed it closely, but failed to take any action, even though Sandusky
had been a key member of his coaching staff for almost 30 years, and had an office just
steps away from Mr. Paterno?s. At the very least, Mr. Paterno could have alerted the
entire football staff, in order to prevent Sandusky from bringing another child into the
Lasch Building. Messrs. Spanier, Schultz, Paterno and Curley also failed to alert the
Board of Trustees about the 1998 investigation or take any further action against Mr.
Sandusky. None of them even spoke to Sandusky about his conduct. In short, nothing
was done and Sandusky was allowed to continue with impunity.
Based on the evidence, the only known, intervening factor between the decision
made on February 25, 2001 by Messrs. Spanier, Curley and Schulz to report the
incident to the Department of Public Welfare, and then agreeing not to do so on
February 27
th
, was Mr. Paterno?s February 26
th
conversation with Mr. Curley.
We never had the opportunity to talk with Mr. Paterno, but he did say what he
told McQueary on February 10, 2011 when McQueary reported what he saw Sandusky
doing in the shower the night before: ?You did what you had to do. It is my job now to
figure out what we want to do.? Why would anyone have to figure out what had to be
done in these circumstances? We also know that he delayed reporting Sandusky?s
sexual conduct because Mr. Paterno did not ?want to interfere? with people?s weekend.
To his credit, Mr. Paterno stated on November 9, 2011, ?With the benefit of hindsight, I
wish I had done more.?
Their callous and shocking disregard for child victims was underscored by the
Grand Jury, which noted in its November 4, 2011 presentment that there was no
?attempt to investigate, to identify Victim 2 or to protect that child or others from similar
conduct, except as related to preventing its reoccurrence on University property.?
None of these four men took any responsible action after February 2001 other
than Mr. Curley informing the Second Mile that Mr. Sandusky had showered with a boy.
Even though they all knew about the 1998 incident, the best they could muster to
protect Sandusky?s victims was to ask Sandusky not to bring his ?guests? into the Penn
State facilities.
Although we found no evidence that the Penn State Board of Trustees was
aware of the allegations regarding Sandusky in 1998 and 2001, that does not shield the
Board from criticism. In this matter, the Board ? despite its duties of care and oversight
of the University and its Officers ? failed to create an environment which held the
University?s most senior leaders accountable to it. Mr. Spanier resisted the Board?s
attempt to have more transparency. In fact, around the time that Mr. Sandusky, Mr.
Curley and Mr. Schultz were arrested, Mr. Spanier was unwilling to give the Board any
more information about what was going on than what he was providing to the public. 6
After a media report on March 31, 2011, the Board was put on notice about
serious allegations that Sandusky was sexually assaulting children on the Penn State
campus. The Board failed in its duty to make reasonable inquiry into these serious
matters and to demand action by the President.
The President, a Senior Vice President, and General Counsel did not perform
their duty to make timely, thorough and forthright reports of these 1998 and 2001
allegations to the Board. This was a failure of governance for which the Board must also
bear responsibility.
We also found that:
? The Board did not have regular reporting procedures or committee structures
to ensure disclosure of major risks to the University;
? Some Trustees felt their meetings were a ?rubber stamp? process for Mr.
Spanier?s actions;
? The Board did not independently ask for more information or assess the
underreporting by Spanier about the Sandusky investigation after May 2011
and thereby failed to oversee properly his executive management of the worst
crisis in Penn State?s history;
? The Board was over-confident in Spanier?s abilities to handle crises and was
unprepared to deal with:
o the filing of criminal charges against senior University leaders and a
prominent former football coach in November, 2011; and,
o the firing of Coach Paterno.
From 1998?2011, Penn State?s ?Tone at the Top? for transparency, compliance,
police reporting and child protection was completely wrong, as shown by the inaction
and concealment on the part of its most senior leaders, and followed by those at the
bottom of the University?s pyramid of power. This is best reflected by the janitors?
decision not to report Sandusky?s horrific 2000 sexual assault of a young boy in the
Lasch Building shower. The janitors were afraid of being fired for reporting a powerful
football coach.
