• Follow us on Twitter @buckeyeplanet and @bp_recruiting, like us on Facebook! Enjoy a post or article, recommend it to others! BP is only as strong as its community, and we only promote by word of mouth, so share away!
  • Consider registering! Fewer and higher quality ads, no emails you don't want, access to all the forums, download game torrents, private messages, polls, Sportsbook, etc. Even if you just want to lurk, there are a lot of good reasons to register!

2020 tOSU Offense

Jump to latest Follow Reply
Sort by date Sort by votes
BREAKING NEWS: JUSTIN FIELDS IS GOOD AT MEN’S TACKLE FOOTBALL

The actual number of times that Justin completed a pass on 3rd down and the Buckeyes failed to get a first down: 3

Three times. In the entire 2019 season.

Pardon the use of sentence fragments, but it is difficult to be articulate when trying to express something that you can scarcely wrap your mind around. I watched every 3rd down on which the Buckeyes dropped back to pass last year and Justin completed a pass to a receiver who failed to gain a first down 3 times. All year.

  • 3rd and 15 vs Cincinnati in 4 down territory. The Buckeyes likely would have gone for it if Hill had managed a few YAC. Not a legit attempt to get a first down. More on this later.
  • 3rd and 26 from the 48 vs PSU. Crossing pattern to Dobbins meant purely to play for field position (Necessitated by a phantom holding call against Munford). Not a legit attempt to get a first down.
  • A very painful 3rd and 5 late in the year that will be covered in more than one post, later.
To recap: The number of times that Fields completed a pass and failed to get a first down, on a down where the coaching staff was really trying to get a first down: one. One time. All year.

Weird Stat: Fields scrambled for a first down only 3 times (on 3rd down) all year, and never on 3rd and 10 or more. He also never scored on a scramble on 3rd down.

What I Wish I’d kept track of: Position of the receiver relative to the first down marker on incompletions.

Up Next: YAC YAC YAC
 
Last edited:
Upvote 0
Talking about YAC

There was some conjecture based on the original numbers that a lot of the 3rd down conversions were due to YAC. The truth is that this happened 8 times all year. Combining the 8 first-downs with the 3 times (all year) that a completion was made without gaining a first-down, we get 11 times (26% of the time) that the ball was completed short of the sticks on a 3rd down pass.

The question then is, of those 11 throws, how many of those 8 first downs was it the receiver bailing Fields out and how many were plays that were designed to get YAC? To answer that, we have to know which plays are designed to get YAC. This becomes clear when you track the patterns run on all 3rd down passes and how often they result in YAC.

The answer is about as startling as the fact that Justin Fields is a good football player. There are only 2 kinds of routes where A) more than one pass was completed on 3rd down, and B) more than 50% of the time there were zero YAC: Out Routes (77.78%) and Hooks (58.33%). It might be surprising to some that out routes resulted in zero YAC a higher percentage of the time than hooks (hitch/comeback), but having watched them all it was amazing how often the ball would be completed exactly on the sideline with the receiver having zero chance to turn upfield. These out routes then were clearly designed to have zero YAC.

In fact, only two out routes all year resulted in YAC. One of those times was against Rutgers when Hill got 1 yard after the catch on a play where he would have had the first down without the YAC. The only time that an out route required YAC for a first down all year was in the first quarter of the National Semi-Final. It was 3rd and 14 from the 5 yard line and it appeared the Buckeyes were only settling for field position with the primary receiver covered farther downfield, but Hill churned out 9 yards after the catch on a heroic effort to make it one yard past the sticks.

As for hooks, only 2 were thrown short of the sticks all year: one being the aforementioned pass to Hill (previous post) where it was clear that they were not trying to get a first down. On that pass however, based on field position, down and distance (3rd and 15 from the opponents 42), Ohio State was probably expecting a zone defense because that was by far the most common defense chosen in that situation (more on that later). The route run was a hook into what would have been the seam and it almost certainly would have gotten some YAC, perhaps enough that the Buckeyes would have gone for it on 4th down (highly likely in that field position with the score still 0-0). The other hook thrown short of the sticks went to Victor in the B1G CCG. There, it appeared that Day and company were just going for field position by throwing an 11-yard hook on 3rd and 18 at their own 38 yard line. The Badgers were in quarters coverage (common on 3rd and long) and Victor scratched out 17 yards after the catch on individual effort.

To Recap: On routes designed for zero YAC, Fields completed the ball short of the sticks 3 times all year and all 3 times the Buckeyes appeared to be playing for field position on 3rd and very long. On 2 of those 3 occasions his receiver bailed him out and got the first down anyway.

Weird Stat: Hill got all of the YAC on out routes. Victor got 49 of the 51 YAC on hook routes.

What I Wish I’d kept track of: Primary receiver on every play – Not possible, but it would tell you a lot.

Up Next: Now that we’ve established that the problems with data compilation haven’t changed the fact that Justin Fields is amazing (some of you may have already known that); let’s return to the original point of the original post. The Ohio State offense is much better when passing on 3rd and long than when passing on 3rd and medium. The problems with data compilation didn’t change that fact either; they just made it seem worse than it really is, especially for Justin. So what were Justin’s numbers?
 
Upvote 0
3rd and MEDIUM – CAN WE GET A FALSE START?

If it’s 3rd and 7, the Buckeyes were better off taking a 5-yard penalty last year than just snapping the ball and taking their chances. After the original post, we were all wondering why. How could a team that is all-timer good on 3rd and long struggle, relatively speaking, on 3rd and medium? After watching every passing 3rd down of 2019, the reason is clear. More importantly, the future is bright (assuming there’s a future).

The original post showed only what was available at the site with the raw data, which were team numbers. Having watched every 3rd down pass, I can offer some numbers specific to the starter.

50102727202_6281e3160c_o.jpg


None of those number were bad, but this Fields-only table highlights the all-timer on 3rd and long, outside the top 20 on 3rd and medium strangeness.

The first thing we need to do is address the field position issue. Did 3rd and medium in the red zone skew the numbers? The following table puts a pin in that theory:

50102500666_eb5163c623_o.jpg


As you can see, red zone passing brought Justin’s rating up, not down. There may have been an effect on completion percentage, but that’s not uncommon; having a higher rating on 3rd and 10+ than on 3rd and anything-else is uncommon.

To Recap: Yes, Justin is possibly the best 3rd and long passer in college football history. Yes, he is above average on 3rd and anything-else. No, it’s not because of field position.

Weird Stat: All of it. Everything in this post is weird.

What I Wish I’d kept track of: Distance thrown beyond LOS on 3rd down incompletions.

Up Next: So what is the issue?
 
Last edited:
Upvote 0
The Real Hole in Their Swing

What’s wrong on 3rd and medium? That’s the big question.

The flaw in the source data made me think that perhaps the Buckeyes aren’t throwing the ball far enough downfield on 3rd and medium. Going through play-by-play debunked that. Several people, both in this thread and in real life, suggested that field position was skewing the data, that perhaps more 3rd and mediums occurred in the red zone. The previous post proves otherwise. So we are down to two possibilities.

What we’re left with is either Ohio State’s offense is doing something differently on those downs or the defense is doing something differently on those downs. In watching every third down and examining the data, I can say with certainty it’s not the offense.

Ryan Day and his staff did an excellent job of mixing up the formations, patterns, etc on 3rd down. There was no discernible tendency that would explain the difference in the data. Rather than show the giant profusion of data necessary to prove that negative, I’ll just get straight to what the answer is.

The first clue into what is really happening here came with an examination of when opposing defenses blitzed.

50102500691_cb8d812043_o.jpg


There you have it. The defense is most likely to blitz on 3rd and 7 to 9, the distance at which Justin and the offense struggle (relatively speaking), and they are least likely to blitz on 3rd and 10+, the distance at which Justin and the offense are the biggest kickers in the history of ass. All there is left to do is to chart passing based on blitzing AND distance to go on 3rd down.


50102727212_513ac92e63_o.jpg


If you notice that there is a difference between the number of attempts in this table and the number of snaps in the previous table, congratulations. The total snaps includes sacks and scrambles. By the way, only 1 third down sack came on a play with no blitz. The other 8 (7 really) were due to a blitz.

Looking at these numbers, two things jump out:

  1. Whether there was a blitz or not, the offense had a slightly higher rating on 3rd and long than on 3rd and medium.
  2. The offense was a LOT better when not facing a blitz, and that’s the real difference in the data.
I’m sure there are some who would dismiss this and say that all offenses struggle with the blitz, that’s why defenses blitz. The only problem with that is, nothing could be further from the truth. Dwayne Haskins was an impresario at making defenses pay for blitzing. So was Dan Marino. Cite your own example. It may be an uncommon skill, at least at a high level, but it exists.

That brings us to the hole in Ohio State’s swing. The offense did not make defenses pay for blitzing last year. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that they didn’t make them pay nearly enough nor dearly enough. They may have completed 80% on 3rd and long against the blitz, but there was also a sack and a scramble short of the first down (which might as well be a sack), and none of the completions was ever for a touchdown on such plays.

Even that is misleading, because when defenses blitzed on 3rd and long, it was usually a zone blitz. Such things did not fool Justin Fields, not even a little. Against zone blitzes on 3rd down in 2019, Justin Fields was 9 of 10 for 121 yards, 0 touchdowns, 0 interceptions for a rating of 191.64. On 3rd and long when they didn’t zone blitz but rather brought 5 or more pass rushers Ohio State did not make a single first down all year.

Now that it is clear that blitzing in general was the problem (and zone blitzing was not), that begs the question of why this was a problem. This analysis uncovered a couple of possible answers.

The data gives us a hint when we look at blitzes by defensive backs. By my count this happened only 12 times on 3rd down in 2019, but admittedly it was sometimes hard to tell as the numbers of some of the blitzers weren’t readily apparent and several of our opponents had linebackers that weren’t much bigger than an average DB. On the 12 occasions when I was able to clearly identify a DB blitz there were 2 sacks, a scramble short of the first down (still might as well be a sack), and 4 for 8 passing for 27 yards, a touchdown and the one 3rd down pick thrown all year for a rating of 94.60. Granted, the sample size is small, but this data hints at something that your eyes probably told you last year. It is something that your eyes scream at you when you watch 3rd down passing, one play after another, over and over while writing down every detail over a period of days. Justin Fields and the Ohio State offensive line struggled with delayed blitzes. I’m not casting aspersions; it’s just a fact. The numbers on DB blitzes hint at this because most of the DB blitzes were either delayed blitzes or they included delayed blitzes from a linebacker.

This is not something that was lost on Ohio State’s opponents late in the year. Clemson ran delayed blitzes a lot, including on most passing-situation 3rd downs.

To Recap: Ohio State struggled (relatively speaking) on 3rd and medium because defenses blitzed a lot more on 3rd and medium. The Buckeyes struggled with the blitz, and struggled mightily with delayed blitzes. Based on the numbers, it is fortunate that defenses did not blitz more on 3rd and long.

Weird Stat: Of 8 incompletions to Hill and Olave on 3rd down, all but one occurred on a play on which the defense blitzed.

What I Wish I’d kept track of: For every play with a blitz, whether it included a delayed blitz.

Up Next: That one 3rd down…
 
Last edited:
Upvote 0
The Most Painful 3rd down

This series will end on a high note (in part because I won’t mention that Justin Fields may never again play in the S&G), but this analysis would be incomplete if I did not mention the most painful 3rd down of the entire year.

No, it wasn’t the interception in the National Semi-Final. Same game, but later.

No, it wasn’t on the final, painful possession of the year. There were no 3rd down passes on that possession.

No, the most painful 3rd down was the last 3rd down pass of the year. Recall way back to the beginning of this series; there was one pass all year that was completed on a 3rd down where the coaching staff was legitimately trying to get a first down with the play called but the play fell short. Yeah. That was the last 3rd down pass of the year. And the way it happened is what really makes it sting.

By that point in the year, the book was out on Justin Fields and the Ohio State offensive line. They struggled with the delayed blitz, and Clemson brought it. They brought it on the first 5 passing 3rd downs and 6 of the first 7.

Then came 3rd and 5 at the Clemson 40 with 4:20 to go. Clemson had blitzed on every 3rd down from this distance the whole game. Ryan Day had them. They were sure to blitz; he hadn’t targeted Austin Mack on a screen on 3rd down all year. The linebackers would be caught in the wash at the LOS, the Buckeyes would make a first down or at least get close enough to get it easily on 4th down. The clock would tick, the coils would tighten. We could all taste it.

But no. Sometimes you have to tip your hat to a good defensive call, but you don’t have to like it.

To fully appreciate what happened, travel back with me to the first game of the year. The first 3rd down throw of the year came on a 3rd and 6. The opponent (FAU) rushed 3. It was the first 3rd down throw of the year, but as of that December day it had been the ONLY time all year that the opponent brought only 3 pass rushers on a 3rd down with 4 to 6 yards to go. So of course the last 3rd down of the year is a 3rd and 5 and the opponent brings… 3 pass rushers. The linebackers were not caught in the wash at the LOS. They were deployed perfectly to bring Mack down for a 1 yard gain.

Feel free to either watch this or jam crochet needles in your eyes. The sensation will be the same.



To Recap: First 3rd down pass of the year: To Go - 4 to 6 yards. Defense rushes 3.
Last 3rd down pass of the year: To Go - 4 to 6 yards. Defense rushes 3.
In between the first 3rd down pass of the year and the last one, all season long, on every 3rd down with 4 to 6 yards to go: Defense rushes more than 3, usually blitzes, bringing at least 5. Ryan Day was right to expect the blitz; it was a good call. Clemson was more right to not blitz; it was a better call.
Kill Me.

Weird Stat: Nothing weird here. Just pain. Nothing but pain.

What I Wish I’d kept track of: Not this.

Up Last: If there’s football in 2020…
 
Last edited:
Upvote 0
Bubble Wrap

When you watch every 3rd down pass of a season in the span of a few days you notice things. Fortunately, not all of the things you notice are things that make you want to bungee jump with a hemp rope tight around your neck. One of the most encouraging things I noticed was that the record setting offense that Ohio State fielded in 2019 still had the bubble wrap on it.

Most of the support for this view is anecdotal, admittedly. But when you watch every 3rd down in just a few days, the patterns are unmistakable.

First, the struggles with delayed blitzes really came from the same place as the fact that Justin frequently took a beat longer than we would have liked to make a decision at times. He was in his first year with the system and it showed. The coaches tried to give him easy throws to try to ameliorate this, and that shows up in the data. Justin threw 16 hooks and 11 out routes on 3rd down. Further, every single one of the out routes was to the field. Point being, they relied on Justin to throw the ball to a spot and use the strength of his arm to get the ball there before the defense could get there. The only other route that was thrown as often as either of those was the crossing route (11 times). While not as easy to throw as the hook or the out, these throws averaged just over 7 yards past the LOS and were some of the shortest (Justin to the receiver) in the arsenal (and Justin is good at throwing that route). Where the struggles occurred was when the defense did something unexpected and one of the primary options wasn’t open.

Sure, Justin struggled when defenses did things that were unexpected. But watching things all at once, and watching as many all-22 videos as I could find, it was clear that he had not been given many options. He was given plays to run and he ran them. He had a set route tree and much of the time there were no hot routes at all. If the defense switched to something that the coaching staff didn’t expect after the check-with-me to the sideline; things could get dicey. It happens.

One has to wonder (don’t worry, I won’t mention that 2020 football might not happen) if Justin might not have more options this year and if that might not open things up a bit. One wonders if a little more familiarity will help him to remain composed when a delayed blitz happens. Further, one wonders if his center might not be a little better at setting protections that account for such things as he also has another year in the system under his belt.

Finally, as good as Justin was at throwing the long ball last year, he did so rarely on 3rd down. Of his 4 completions of 20 or more yards on 3rd down, 2 were on scramble-drills. I counted 6 times all year when the intended receiver’s original route was a deep one. As good as the fly was on other downs, it was run twice on 3rd down all year, only once in conference play. As good as the slant and up route was on other downs, it was run only once on 3rd down all year.

To Recap: How good might the offense be if they take the bubble wrap off of it?

Weird Stat: Although the official Ohio State play-by-play statistics cite several patterns as having been posts in 2019, none of the ones cited were posts. Only 2 posts were thrown on 3rd down all year. They were the only third downs passes thrown against Miami.

What I Wish I’d kept track of: Defensive fronts and coverages against all Ohio State 3rd downs, not just the pass.

Up Next: Resting my fingers
 
Last edited:
Upvote 0
An Aside on QB Draws

The multi-post analysis of every 3rd down on which Justin Fields dropped back to pass last year was just that: an analysis of plays on which he dropped back to pass. If the clear intent of the play was a QB draw, the play was not included in the analysis. But to perform the analysis, knowing that the play-by-play stats could not be trusted, I watched every single 3rd down all year on which the play ended with the ball in Justin’s hands and made my own decision on sacks, scrambles, and draws. The result of having watched all of that, but not included any of the draws in the spreadsheet, is purely anecdotal of course. The conclusions drawn from it are no less certain for all of that, and they can be summed up in two words: Penn State.

Up to that game the QB draw had been used sparingly. In that game it was used on the first two 3rd downs of the game. It worked on both of those and it continued to work, including on a 4th and 5 late in the first half. Then, the Buckeyes stopped using it and the game got close. Ohio State went back to using the QB draw sparingly for the rest of the year.

This just confirms what we already know: Justin Fields was never 100% again after that game. His arm was great, certainly. But the elimination of the QB draw as a significant threat, a threat that eviscerated the 2nd best defense in the B1G, left Ohio State playing without one of its 3 most powerful weapons in the stretch run last year.

Oh Well
 
Last edited:
Upvote 0
ScriptOhio said:


Former Buckeye Terry McLaurin, who went from a third-round pick from Washington to quietly become one of the best wide receivers in the NFL as a rookie last year weighed in as well.



A room full of killas, indeed.
Click to expand...

Those 3 are in the WR room, and led by a former 3star... That shows even more how talented the room is
 
Upvote 0
DaddyBigBucks said:
An Aside on QB Draws

The multi-post analysis of every 3rd down on which Justin Fields dropped back to pass last year was just that: an analysis of plays on which he dropped back to pass. If the clear intent of the play was a QB draw, the play was not included in the analysis. But to perform the analysis, knowing that the play-by-play stats could not be trusted, I watched every single 3rd down all year on which the play ended with the ball in Justin’s hands and made my own decision on sacks, scrambles, and draws. The result of having watched all of that, but not included any of the draws in the spreadsheet, is purely anecdotal of course. The conclusions drawn from it are no less certain for all of that, and they can be summed up in two words: Penn State.

Up to that game the QB draw had been used sparingly. In that game it was used on the first two 3rd downs of the game. It worked on both of those and it continued to work, including on a 4th and 5 late in the first half. Then, the Buckeyes stopped using it and the game got close. Ohio State went back to using the QB draw sparingly for the rest of the year.

This just confirms what we already know: Justin Fields was never 100% again after that game. His arm was great, certainly. But the elimination of the QB draw as a significant threat, a threat that eviscerated the 2nd best defense in the B1G, left Ohio State playing without one of its 3 most powerful weapons in the stretch run last year.

Oh Well
Click to expand...

100%. I said something similar a week after the Clemson game.

The offense Day was planning on running against elite defenses was far different than what we saw all year. PSU was a dress rehearsal and it was extremely effective.

If Fields doesn't get hurt again against TSUN, I actually think he would've been close to 100% for the Clemson game. That being said, I'm still shocked he got back up from that hit. That's something you see happy 50 times, and maybe 3 or 4 guys are able to continue playing.
 
Upvote 0


Left Tackle
75 Thayer Munford (6-6 315), Sr
Has 26 starts the last two years, earning Second-Team All-Big Ten recognition last year. Past back issues could be a concern.

Left Guard
76 Harry Miller (6-4 315), Soph
Miller is the betting favorite to win this job and then do very well with it for a year before moving to center next year.

Center
71 Josh Myers (6-5 312), rJr
Myers is one of the best centers in the nation and very capable of becoming OSU’s latest Rimington winner.

Right Guard
52 Wyatt Davis (6-4 315), rJr
Davis was a First-Team All-American last year and could be the first interior linemen selected in the 2021 NFL Draft.

Right Tackle
78 Nicholas Petit-Frere (6-5 305), rSoph
Greg Studrawa said in the spring that Petit-Frere is finally where he needs to be in terms of size and strength.

OR

79 Dawand Jones (6-8 359), Soph
Jones was the surprise of the 2019 recruiting class and will battle for the starting spot here.

OR

77 Paris Johnson (6-6 305), Fr
Losing spring hurts Johnson’s chances here, but he may be good enough to overcome the setback.

National House of Pancakes

nhoplogo.jpg


:lol:
 
Upvote 0
You must log in or register to reply here.
Back
Top